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  The aim of this paper is to assess the relationship between individual skills and 
labour market performance of immigrants residing in Lombardy during the period 2001-
2005. We use a recent dataset collected by the NGO ISMU, which includes information on 
individual characteristics and the legal status of each immigrant. Our results show that 
returns on schooling are positive and range from 0.8 per cent to 0.9 per cent, a figure that is 
much lower than the one estimated for native Italians. This result is robust to a number of 
specifications and tests. In particular, it is not influenced by the legal status of the alien or by 
a possible self-selection in the labour supply. Moreover, although more talented immigrants 
tend to self-select in the Lombardy region compared with the other Italian regions, their 
return on schooling remains low compared with natives. We also show that a certain 
heterogeneity exists across educational levels and countries of origin: immigrants from 
Eastern Europe are better able to exploit their human capital, especially when they hold a 
university degree, while the school-wage profile of Latin Americans and Asians is basically 
flat. Finally, there is some evidence of a cohort effect in migration, but this tends to impact 
on the return on experience rather than on the return on schooling. 
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1.  Introduction
1 
Immigration is a relatively new phenomenon in Italy. In the 1991 census, the share of 
legal immigrants in the Italian population was still only 0.5 per cent, whereas at the 
beginning of 2006 it had risen to 4.7 per cent (2.7 million individuals). The foreign 
population grew steadily in the 1990s and in the first half of the 2000s. The average yearly 
growth rate of the legal immigrant population was 17 per cent in the period 1991-2001 and 
20 per cent in 2002-2005 (ISMU, 2007).
2 As Borjas (1994) points out, unexpected large 
inflows of immigrants from less developed countries usually draw the attention of scholars 
and policy makers to three major questions: what is the immigrant’s performance in the host 
country? What is the impact of massive immigration on the employment opportunities of 
natives? What is an optimal immigration policy for the host country?  
The aim of this paper is to deal with the first question.
3 In particular, we focus on the 
portability of immigrants’ human capital in the host country:
4 we estimate their return on 
education by assessing the relation between immigrants’ schooling levels and their 
performance on the labour market of Lombardy in the period 2001-2005. We pay particular 
attention to the legal position of immigrants, to mobility in the host country, and to 
differentiated returns according to country of origin. 
We make use of an entirely new database collected by the non-governmental 
organization  ISMU (Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicità −  Initiatives and Studies on 
                                                           
1  We wish to thank Prof. G. Blangiardo, of ISMU, for kindly providing the dataset. We are also indebted 
to Paolo Pinotti for his valuable comments, the participants at the seminar held in the Bank of Italy, two 
anonymous referees for helping us to improve this version of the paper and Christine Stone for editorial 
assistance. The views expressed are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. 
Usual disclaimers apply. E-mail: antonio.accetturo@bancaditalia.it, luigi.infante@bancaditalia.it 
 
2 High growth rates in the period 2002-2005 are inflated by the registration of illegal immigrants already 
within the Italian borders, benefiting from the 2002 amnesty (Bossi-Fini Law). 
3 Immigration studies in Italy are still in their infancy. Mocetti and Porello (2008) assess the impact of 
immigration on natives’ labour market and find that massive immigration causes an outflow of less educated 
natives and an inflow of more skilled ones. To the best of our knowledge, the third question has never been 
explored for Italian immigration laws. 
4 Another strand of the literature on this topic relates to the wage differences between natives and foreigners 
(see e.g. Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1985). For Italy, Brandolini et al. (2005) deal with this issue using social 
security system data, which consider only legal workers. 
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Multiethnic Society) from surveys of immigrants from the least developed, emerging and 
transition countries residing in the region of Lombardy in the North-West of Italy.  
Several studies in Italy have assessed the determinants of immigrants’ wages. Among 
the few notable exceptions, Baldacci et al. (1999) use survey data of similar design to the 
ISMU database (Blangiardo, 1993 and 1996) but for two areas (southern Lazio and northern 
Campania) with radically different labour market conditions (e.g. high unemployment in the 
provinces of southern Lazio and relatively high crime rates in the provinces of Campania). 
International experience on the topic is much richer. Using data on immigrants in 
Israel, Friedberg (2000) shows that a key role in explaining the wage gap between earnings 
of immigrants and earnings of natives is the labour market evaluation of foreigners’ human 
capital. Friedberg illustrates that, once in the new country, immigrants tend to accept any 
kind of job, even ones in which they cannot fully exploit their human capital and skills. 
Schaafsma and Sweetman (2001) confirm this view and show that human capital 
transferability is easier for those who arrived in the host country in their teens, while more 
mature immigrants usually have a larger wage discount and a lower return on education 
compared with young immigrants. Evidence for a lower return on education for immigrants 
is also found in Sweden by le Grand and Szulkin  (2002) and in Canada by Ferrer and 
Riddell (2008). Using information on immigrants from the former USSR still in Israel, 
Eckstein and Weiss (2004) also found no return for imported human capital (measured by 
schooling and experience), while these skills receive a larger return the longer the time spent 
in Israel.  
Our results are consistent with the international evidence. Immigrants’ return on 
education in the Lombardy labour market is positive, but much lower than for Italian natives. 
This result is robust to a number of specifications. For example, it does not seem to depend 
on the kind of self-selection from the source country or on the selection of the local labour 
market where the immigrant decides to locate. Illegal immigrants are less able to exploit 
their skills on the labour market, their return on education is lower than that of legal aliens. 
Immigrants from Eastern Europe are more likely to exploit their human capital stock better, 
especially if they have a university degree. Finally, we find some evidence of a cohort effect 
in migration, showing the existence of systematic differences in earnings for different waves 
of immigrants. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the dataset. 
Section 3 introduces the methodology used in our estimates. Section 4 reports the results of 
the baseline regression. Section 5 presents a number of robustness exercises. Section 6 
concludes.  
2.  Data description 
2.1  Survey design 
Since 2001, the ISMU has conducted a yearly survey across immigrants living in 
Lombardy. The individuals surveyed (slightly more than 8,000 each year) are chosen 
according to a multi-stage design. In the first stage, the ISMU interviewers allocate the total 
number of questionnaires across the 11 provinces of Lombardy to obtain roughly the same 
sample variability within each province. In the second stage, the ISMU selects a number of 
representative municipalities (slightly less than 350, almost 25 per cent of all the towns in 
Lombardy) within each province according to the social and economic characteristics of 
each area. In the third stage, the ISMU selects, within each municipality, the potential 
interviewees using the method of aggregation centres (suggested by Blangiardo, 1993). 
According to this technique, whenever a large proportion of immigrants is irregular, 
the total number of foreign individuals living in a country cannot be accurately computed. 
Nevertheless, every immigrant, including illegal aliens, has a social life: they go to work, 
spend free time in leisure facilities, attend religious centres and use healthcare services. 
Blangiardo’s method hinges on these centres as the only means of finding the immigrants 
(especially illegal ones) within a country. In practice, the ISMU first chooses the aggregation 
centres and then, within each centre, randomly selects the immigrants to survey. For the i-th 
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all-in number of immigrants living in the area and u represents a binary variable equal to 1 if  
the i-th individual attends the j-th centre.
5 
Every individual attending the centre has the same probability of being sampled as the 
interviewer and the interviewee meet randomly. A problem of overrepresentation of 
individuals who attend a large number of aggregation centres may occur. In order to tackle 
this bias, the ISMU provides a system of sample weights,
 which are discussed at length in 
Blangiardo (1993).  
2.2  How many irregulars can the ISMU survey? 
In each questionnaire, the ISMU asks for the immigrant’s legal status. Obviously, this 
information is subject to misreporting; although ISMU interviewers collaborate with the 
directors of aggregation centres and are usually trusted by most of the immigrants, we cannot 
exclude that some of the undocumented immigrants may decide not to reveal their true legal 
status. In order to quantify the extent of misreporting, we compare the ISMU’s estimates 
with other data sources. The most recent alternative dataset is based on applications for 
regularization under the Bossi-Fini amnesty of 2002. In that year, 144,369 individuals 
applied in Lombardy (647,000 in the whole of Italy): this indicates that at least the 31 per 
cent
6 of the total foreign population in Lombardy was irregular in 2002. Although some 
misreporting does seem to occur, the ISMU’s estimates for the pre-amnesty years do not 
appear to be far off this figure: in the 2002 wave, self-declared illegal aliens represented 27 
per cent of the sample, as percentage that decreased rapidly in the following years as a result 
of the regularization process. Pooling all cross-sections in the period 2001-2005, self-
declared irregulars average around 17 per cent.  
2.3  Data description 
The ISMU survey is divided into sections containing general information on the 
immigrant and his or her family (gender, age, country of origin, legal status, religion, civil 
                                                           
5 See Blangiardo (1993) for details.  
6 Obviously, we cannot exclude that a number of illegal aliens did not apply. 
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status, type of job); other sections investigate the immigrant’s social life, access to public 
services and so on. Summary statistics of all the variables used in the regressions are 
displayed in Table 1. As the Table shows, immigrants in Lombardy are on average fairly 
young (33.9 years old) and have resided in Italy for a relatively short period (6 years). Most 
of the immigrants  come from Africa (38 per cent) and are Muslims (42 per cent). Women 
represent 42 per cent of all immigrants. A fairly large share of aliens lived in another Italian 
region before moving to Lombardy (39 per cent), indicating that internal mobility is quite 
high. 
3.  Estimation issues 
ISMU data are used to estimate the following basic wage equation by OLS: 
(1) ln  wi = α + θ*Si + β1*expi + β2*expi
2 + β3*oexpi + β4*oexpi
2 + β5*Xi + Dorigini + 
Dprovincei + Dyeari + ui  
where   is the net monthly wage,   is the years of schooling i w i S
7 of individual i,   is the 
potential experience acquired in the Italian labour market, oexpi is a measure for potential 
experience in the country of origin,   is a matrix containing a number of individual 




i Dorigin i Dprovince i Dyear
8 province in which the immigrant resides (spatial control), and year in which the 
individual was surveyed.
9  
                                                           
 
7 As usual in this literature, we assigned zero years of schooling when the individual does not have any 
formal education, 8 years for a compulsory school leaving certificate, 13 years for high school and 17 for at 
least a university degree. Obviously, this may not reflect the actual years in education, given the wide 
differences between educational systems. We checked this hypothesis by estimating our equation for the 
educational level actually recognized by the Italian authorities (a question included in 3 surveys out of 5). 
Results, in this case, do not change and we preferred to use all data instead of restricting our analysis to three 
surveys. 
8 We grouped immigrant’s country of origin into four areas: Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America.  
9 It is well-known in the literature that OLS estimates may be biased due to the possible correlation of the 
(unobserved) innate abilities with the number of years spent in education. A way to deal with this issue (see 
Card, 2001, for an exhaustive review) is to instrument the schooling variable. In this paper, we used classical 
OLS estimations for two reasons. First, we are not actually interested in disentangling the education effect from 
the innate abilities. The aim of this paper is to assess whether immigrants with different skills can receive 
different market evaluations for their abilities in the labour market in Lombardy. Second, the ISMU dataset 
 7   
The variable of potential experience,  , is proxied by the number of years spent in 
Italy so far, which seems reasonable since the unemployment level among immigrants is 
fairly low.  
i exp
To take into account experience acquired in the country of origin, we use the variable 
oexpi, built by subtracting from the immigrant’s age the years spent in Italy, the years spent 
in education, and 6 (the first 6 years of life). Along with education, this variable captures the 
portability of immigrants’ human capital into the destination country (Friedberg, 2000). A 
significant and positive coefficient would reveal a certain degree of compatibility between 
previous experience abroad and the skill requirements of the host country’s labour market. 
Individual characteristics include gender, a dummy for married people, and the sector of 
occupation.  
Estimating equation (1) for immigrants may lead to six additional problems:  
−  Self-selection from the source country; 
−  Self-selection in the labour market participation; 
−  Selection of the host region; 
−  Legal status of the immigrants; 
−  Cohort quality; 
−  Non-linearities across ethnic/skill groups. 
The first source of bias relates to the self-selection of immigrants from the source 
country. Immigrants usually do not represent a random sample of the population of origin. 
Immigration choice
10 may depend on the expected relative payoffs between the immigrant’s 
economic conditions in the source country and expectations of welfare in Italy. This idea 
was formalized in a theoretical model by Roy (1951) for labour market choices and applied 
to migration studies by Borjas (1987). According to the model, whenever relative returns on 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
does not include information on parental background (or IQ tests) which is known to be a good instrument for 
schooling. 
10 Obviously, we focus on economically driven migration choices and we disregard all social or political 
motivations.  
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skills are lower in the source country, immigrants are likely to self-select from the right tail 
of the skill distribution (positive selection). By contrast, whenever relative payoffs are higher 
in the country of origin, immigrants self-select from the left tail of the skill distribution 
(negative selection). This may impact on our estimates of the returns on schooling. A 
possible way to circumvent this problem is to treat it as an omitted heterogeneity bias by 
inserting dummies for areas of origin of the immigrants.
11  
The second source of bias relates to endogenous participation in the labour market. 
Compared with the estimates for natives, this problem actually diminishes for the immigrant 
population, which usually has a lower reservation wage and tends to be more flexible about 
accepting any type of job.
12 Some differences emerge when we evaluate the impact on the 
employment rate by gender and ethnic group: the average employment rate for women was 
61 per cent in 2005 (80 per cent for men), while the employment rate for African women 
was even lower (52 per cent). This implies that a number of institutional and cultural factors 
might influence  labour market participation (especially of women), and this could, in turn, 
bias our estimates. We tackle this problem by treating the participation decision as 
endogenous and by estimating a two-stage Heckman model.  
The third source of bias is connected with the choice of the region of Lombardy within 
the host country. Lombardy is the most economically developed region in Italy and it attracts 
almost one fifth of all immigrants in Italy (Lombardy’s share of the population is 16 per 
cent). Talented immigrants might self-select and locate in more dynamic contexts within the 
country and within the region in order to exploit better their high (unobserved) ability. This 
is not an issue specifically affecting immigrants, since there exists an extensive literature on 
“human capital externalities” which deals with internal migrations and productivity effects 
of agglomeration (spatial sorting problem; for a survey, see Moretti, 2004). However, the 
                                                           
11 Borjas (1987) proposes the use of a measure of return to skills of the source countries, since positive 
(negative) self-selection is often associated with a lower (higher) return to skills in the country of origin. 
Unfortunately, statistics on return to skills are not particularly reliable, especially for developing countries. 
Borjas proposes the use of the Gini index of households’ income distribution, which has been widely criticized 
in the literature. Hendricks (2002) argues that in most empirical papers, aiming to measure emigrant self-
selection, unobserved ability plays a much smaller role than measured ability, such as human capital, and this 
would emerge using different approaches, such as comparing individual workers across borders or earnings of 
return migrants with earnings of those who never migrated. 
12 The employment rate for immigrants in 2005 was 73 per cent (65 per cent for natives in Lombardy). 
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issue is particularly important for immigrants, given their high mobility within the host 
country. This problem does not have a simple solution. We should observe (within the same 
survey) individuals in different regions and all migration patterns for all individuals to assess 
the existence of spatial sorting. The solution we adopt in this paper is constrained by data 
availability and it is based upon the immigrant’s migration paths within the country. In our 
dataset, we are able to distinguish between those who actually chose Lombardy among all 
the Italian regions (“movers”, those who migrated within Italy) and those (residing in 
Lombardy) who never migrated within the host country (“stayers”). We assume that, while 
“movers” are likely to choose Lombardy on the basis of a strong economic incentive (they 
actually self-select in a particular region), “stayers” might choose Lombardy also for non-
economic motives.
13 In any case, the impact of this phenomenon on estimates of the return 
on education is ambiguous. On the one hand, movers’ returns on education should be higher 
than those of stayers because movers are likely to self-select in the area in which their skills 
receive a higher return. On the other hand, immigrants’ networks might help the stayer find a 
better job match, thus increasing her/his return on education. In both cases, internal movers 
might bias our estimates of the return on education and, therefore, we correct this problem 
by interacting all the variables with a dummy assuming the value one if the individual is a 
“mover”.  
An additional source of bias relates to the immigrants’ legal status in the host country. 
Illegal aliens usually suffer a wage discount compared with legal immigrants, which may be 
due either to the lower market price of their human capital (probably owing to discrimination 
in the labour market) or to a possible negative self-selection in the migration process. This, 
in turn, may affect the estimates of the return on education by reducing it for legal 
immigrants. The only possible way to cope with this bias is to make use of the self-reported 
legal status information of the ISMU survey, which, as we saw in the previous section, suffer 
slight misreporting. We interact all the explanatory variables with a dummy variable equal to 
one when the immigrant is self-declared illegal.  
                                                           
13 There is an extensive literature (Card and DiNardo, 2000; Saiz, 2007) showing that immigrants usually 
enter their host country in regions where there are strong family/ethnic connections. 
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Systematic differences in the labour market performance of different migration waves 
(i.e. cohort effect) may be another source of bias. There are a number of explanations for the 
existence of a cohort effect. For example, we can observe a “secular decline” in the quality 
of immigrants due to a change in the source countries. Alternatively, wage level differences 
among immigrant workers in different cohorts may basically reflect exogenous fluctuations 
in labour demand.
14 Even fluctuations in the skill composition of labour demand are likely to 
change the return on education of different cohorts.
15 In order to address this issue, we re-
estimate our baseline regression by augmenting it with cohort dummies and by interacting 
these dummies with years of schooling (the same approach is used in Bockmann and Steiner, 
2006) and with the host country potential experience variable. The cohort dummies are 5-
year interval dummies covering the period 1986-2005, plus a dummy grouping all (the few) 
immigrants that arrived in Italy before 1986.  
The last source of bias is linked to non-linearities in the return on education and 
experience. We adopt a spline regression approach by estimating the return on education for 
each education level and the return on experience for each quartile of the distribution of 
potential experience in Italy.
16 In order to detect the existence of non-linear effects across 
ethnic groups, we also estimate step-wise returns on education according to each sending 
area. In this way, we are able to assess which ethnic group and which educational group 
actually is able to better exploit its human capital stock. 
                                                           
14 International evidence on the existence of a cohort effect for immigrants is mixed. For example, a 
relatively strong labour demand in a certain period may be beneficial for the immigrants of that cohort, raising 
their wage. 
15 For the United States, Borjas (1985) concludes that the steeper age-earning profile of immigrants 
compared with the native population is due to a systematic decline in the quality of successive immigrant 
cohorts, rather than to an increase in the relative earnings since arrival. Differently, Friedberg  (2000) concludes 
that immigration in Israel does not seem to be affected by a cohort quality problem. 
16 We split the variable of potential experience in Italy into four groups: less than 3 years, between 4 and 5 
years, between 6 and 9 years, and more than 9 years.  
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4.  Estimation results 
4.1  Baseline regression 
Table 2 shows the baseline regressions.  Compared with column [1], columns [2] and 
[3] add, respectively, the occupational sector and the legal status of the immigrants. The 
return on education is found to be positive and it shows that any additional year of education 
increases the workers’ wage by 0.7-0.8 per cent. Compared with similar studies, immigrants’ 
return on education in Lombardy is slightly higher than abroad (see, e.g., Eckstein and 
Weiss, 2004, for Israel, in which it is negative, or Friedberg, 2000, in which it is nil), but 
definitely lower than the return on education of natives. For example, Brunello et al. (2001), 
de Blasio and Di Addario (2005), Ciccone et al. (2004) and Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2006) 
found that the return on schooling for Italians ranges from 4.7 to 6.1 per cent, depending on 
the specification. Moreover, Ciccone et al. (2004) found that the return on education in the 
North-West of the country (where Lombardy is located) is even higher (6.6 per cent). These 
results are not surprising. Low returns may be due to the (perceived) low quality of foreign 
schools, imperfect transferability of knowledge or imperfect command of the Italian 
language. Experience in the Italian labour market increases the immigrants’ wage by 3.6-4.9 
per cent per year, a bit more than the estimates for natives (2.3-3.4 per cent) in the papers 
cited. Again, this is not surprising. Once an immigrant succeeds in learning the local 
language and in understanding the crucial features of the Italian labour market, his/her 
marginal productivity and wage increase sharply. The return on experience in the country of 
origin is quite low, 0.8 per cent, signalling scarce compatibility with domestic labour market 
requirements. 
Being female lowers monthly earnings by 26-28 per cent. Sectoral dummies do not 
change the parameter estimates by much and dummies on the legal status are all significant 
and with the expected sign. Irregular workers are paid 20 per cent less than other 
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immigrants
17 for similar individual characteristics, while a permanent visa or Italian 
citizenship
18 creates a wage premium over other immigrants.  
Area-of-origin dummies (not reported) are all significant. Compared with Latin 
Americans, Europeans are likely to earn more (2.7 per cent), while Africans and Asians are 
generally paid less (-3.7 per cent and -1.8 per cent, respectively). 
4.2  Differentiated effects across areas of origin 
The estimate of the return on education for immigrants may hide a great variability 
across areas of origin due to large differences between nations in the quality of education. To 
take account of this, we amend equation (1) allowing the slope related to education to vary 
across areas. As shown in Table 3 (col. [1]), there exists some heterogeneity across areas of 
origin. The return on education is higher for people from Eastern Europe (1.0 per cent), 
while it is 0.3 percentage points lower for Asians, Africans and Latin Americans.  
In the second column of Table 3 we allow the variable for experience (both in Italy and 
abroad) to vary across ethnic groups. The results show that catching up through experience 
in Italy is greater for Asians and Africans (4.1 per cent) while it is slightly lower for Eastern 
Europeans and Latin Americans. Instead, portability of past experience (experience abroad) 
is somewhat greater for people from Eastern Europe (0.8 per cent) and Africa (0.9 per cent), 
but less on average for the other ethnic groups. 
5.  Robustness  
So far we have obtained quite a clear result: immigrants’ returns on education are 
positive, but lower than those of natives. Although this result has some variability across 
sending areas, none of the ethnic groups seems to receive a return on education comparable 
to that of Italians. In this section, we assess the robustness of this result by taking into 
                                                           
17 The benchmark group is represented by immigrants awarded a temporary visa, which is a document valid 
for a specific period of time (according to the type of employment, i.e. seasonal or permanent); it can be 
renewed before the expiry date. 
18 The information on citizenship is available only in a limited number of surveys (namely those for 2003, 
2004 and 2005). 
 13    
account five potential sources of bias: (i) selection of the host region within Italy (spatial 
sorting), (ii) self-selection in labour market participation, (iii) legal status of the immigrants, 
(iv) cohort quality effect and (v) non-linear effects across ethnic/skill groups.  
5.1  Spatial sorting 
The question whether talented individuals tend to concentrate in the most dynamic 
economic context is frequently examined in regional studies. This issue, is of particular 
interest for immigrants, given their high mobility within the host country (39 per cent of the 
immigrants in our sample lived in another region before arriving in Lombardy). As we have 
seen in Section 3, this may bias our estimates of the return on education, although the sign 
cannot be predicted in advance.  
By interacting all explanatory variables with the dummy “mover” (Table 4), we find 
that spatial sorting takes place across immigrants: the return on education for “movers” 
reaches 1.0 per cent, while for “stayers” it averages around (0.6 per cent). A possible 
explanation is that “movers” migrate within the host country in order to find a place where 
they receive a higher return on their private human capital. It should be noted, anyway, that 
the return for movers is still considerably lower than the estimates for natives. Moreover, 
internal migration comes to a cost, since “movers” lose in terms of the return on experience 
in the Italian labour market, probably due to the lack of familiarity with the new local labour 
market. 
5.2  Labour market participation 
We further test the hypothesis of a possible endogeneity bias in labour market 
participation by using a two-stage Heckman model. The dependent variable for the first-
stage probit is a dummy indicating one if the immigrant is working at the survey time; right-
hand-side variables include a mix of personal and ethnic characteristics. As Table 5 shows, 
schooling and potential experience have a positive impact on the probability of being 
employed; being female or Muslim have, instead, a negative influence. By including the 
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inverse mills ratio
19 (Table 6) in the baseline regression we find that, although a process of 
self-selection is at work in labour market participation (the inverse mills ratio is significant), 
our variables of interest do not seem to be much affected: the return on schooling still ranges 
between 0.8 and 0.9 per cent and the return on potential experience in Italy varies between 
3.8 and 5.5 per cent. The wage loss for women, instead, widens (around 28-34 per cent), 
showing that cultural characteristics tend to have a large impact, especially on female labour 
supply and wages.  
5.3  Legal status 
So far, we have treated regulars and irregulars as an homogeneous group, thus 
assuming that the labour market evaluation of individual skills is the same for both groups. 
This may lead to an attenuation bias of the return on education of the regulars, whenever 
illegal aliens do not succeed in obtaining a higher market price for their human capital due to 
discrimination or segregation. 
In order to assess these hypotheses, in Table 7, we interact each regressor in the basic 
specification with a dummy variable for the irregulars. Results do not reject the hypothesis 
of a lower return on schooling for irregulars (although at 10 per cent significance) but it does 
not succeed in significantly raising the return for regulars: while legal aliens earn 0.8 per 
cent more for each year spent in education, illegal aliens earn only 0.4 per cent.
20 
Quite interestingly, the male-female wage gap mostly counterbalances in the irregular 
group. The experience gain is faster for irregulars, probably due to the fact that they start 
with an extremely low entry wage. Additional econometric results
21 (not reported) indicate 
that the experience gain is faster for the first three years in Italy, while irregulars’ return does 
not significantly differ from that of regulars in the subsequent period.    
                                                           
19 The inverse mills ratio is calculated by the ratio between the standard normal density and the cumulative 
standard normal distribution, both calculated at the fitted values of the first-stage regression.  
20 Obviously, this result may suffer from an attenuation bias due to misreporting by illegal aliens (see 
Section 2). 
21 We split the variable of potential experience in Italy into four groups: less than 3 years, between 4 and 5 
years, between 6 and 9 years, and more than 9 years.  
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5.4  Cohort effect 
As explained in Section 3, differences in quality in the cohorts of immigrants may bias 
both the rate of assimilation (return on years since migration) and the return on human 
capital.  
To address this issue we re-estimate our equation augmenting it with cohort dummies 
(the omitted cohort is the most recent) and interacting these dummies with years of schooling 
and with the variable “years in Italy”.  
Our results do not reject the hypothesis of the existence of a cohort effect for 
immigrants in Italy. This effect impacts on the immigrants’ experience in the Italian labour 
market, but we found no evidence of a differentiated return on schooling for different 
cohorts. In the first column of Table 8 we report the results of the basic equation in which 
the coefficient of education is allowed to vary across cohorts (the regression also contains 
the arrival-cohort dummies). An F-test of joint significance of the coefficient does not reject 
the null hypothesis of equality among the school-cohorts coefficients, thus implying that the 
return on schooling does not change for different migration waves. In the second column, the 
estimates contain the interaction between the variable “experience in the Italian labour 
market” with the cohort dummies; in this case the F-test rejects the null hypothesis of 
equality, revealing that a cohort-quality issue is at work. In particular, catching up through 
experience seems to be stronger for more recent cohorts (6.3 per cent for those between 2001 
and 2005; 3.1 per cent for the 1996-2000 cohort), while it is basically flat for those who 
arrived in Italy before 1995. This phenomenon may be explained by the fact that wages for 
earlier cohorts are higher (fixed effects for earlier cohorts are positive and significant 
compared with our reference group) and therefore they display a relatively smaller dynamic 
compared with the more recent arrivals. Specification [3], in which schooling and experience 
are allowed to vary across cohorts, confirm previous estimates. 
5.5  Non-linear effects 
Finally, we test whether returns on education and on experience vary in a non-linear 
way by estimating a spline regression. Following Friedberg (2000), we divide the years of 
education into three classes: compulsory school (8 years), secondary school (13 years), 
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university (17 years). We also divide the potential experience according to the distribution of 
the quartile of years in Italy. The returns on education and experience are then estimated as a 
piece-wise linear function. The estimates are reported in Table 9, column [1]. We find 
evidence of non-linear effects in the return on education and experience. The return on 
education for a graduate is almost double that of people completing secondary school. The 
return on experience is particularly large for recent immigrants (11.2 per cent for those who 
have lived in Italy for less than 3 years), while it tends to converge on lower values for those 
who have lived in Italy for a longer period (more than 9 years, 4.5 per cent). Column [2] 
reports the estimates of the return on education across different ethnic groups for each 
educational level. Once again, Eastern Europeans receive a higher return on education, while 
Latin Americans receive no return. Returns are particularly high for graduates from Eastern 
Europe (1.0 per cent), Asians and Africans receive similar returns across educational levels, 
while only Latin Americans with a university degree seem to receive a statistically 
significant positive return (although lower than the one estimated for other sending areas).  
6.  Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to assess the relation between individual skills and labour 
market performance using a recent dataset collected by the ISMU, which includes 
information on individual characteristics and the legal status of each immigrant over the 
period 2001-2005.  
Our results show that the return on schooling is positive and it ranges between 0.8 per 
cent and 0.9 per cent, a figure that is much lower than the one estimated for Italian natives. 
This result is robust to a number of specifications and tests. In particular, it is not influenced 
by the legal status of the alien or by a possible self-selection in the labour supply. Moreover, 
although Lombardy seems to attract more talented immigrants within Italy, their return on 
schooling remains low compared with natives. We also show the existence of a certain 
heterogeneity across educational levels and countries of origin. In particular, immigrants 
from Eastern Europe are better able to exploit their human capital stock, especially when 
they hold a university degree. Conversely, the school-wage profile of Latin Americans and 
Asians is basically flat. Finally, there is some evidence of a cohort effect in migration, but 
this tends to impact on the return on experience rather than on the return on schooling.  
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 Table 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE MAIN VARIABLES 
 
 







Log(wage) 26,266  6.89  0.47 
School 36,771  10.46  4.53 
Years in Italy  37,163  6.03  4.74 
Female 37,286  0.42  0.49 
Age 37,089  33.89  8.37 
Irregular 37,286  0.17  0.37 
Permanent visa  37,286  0.12  0.32 
Italian citizenship  22,315  0.03  0.18 
Europeans 37,286  0.24  0.43 
Africans 37,286  0.38  0.49 
Latinos 37,286  0.16  0.36 
Asians 37,286  0.21  0.41 
Muslims 37,286  0.42  0.49 
Catholics 37,286  0.30  0.46 
Other Christians  37,286  0.15  0.35 
Buddhists 37,286  0.03  0.18 
Hindu 37,286  0.02  0.12 
Other religions  37,286  0.02  0.15 
Not religious  37,286  0.07  0.25 
Manufacturing blue collars  26,266  0.09  0.28 
Construction blue collars  26,266  0.08  0.27 
Agriculture blue collars  26,266  0.07  0.26 
Specialized blue collars  26,266  0.04  0.19 
Clerks 26,266  0.04  0.19 
Artisans 26,266  0.08  0.28 
Professionals 26,266  0.03  0.18 
Tertiary and other sectors  26,266  0.37  0.48 
Movers 37,286  0.39  0.49 
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Table 2 
BASIC REGRESSION 
  [1] [2] [3] 









































































Irregular     -0.205*** 
(0.016) 
Italian citizenship      0.081*** 
(0.022) 









2  adj.  0.38 0.39 0.27 
No. Obs.  25,849  25,849  16,025
1 
The left-hand side variable is the log of net monthly wages. White-robust standard errors are in brackets. Stars show significance levels, 
*** up to 1 per cent, ** between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, * between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Every regression is weighted according to 
the sample design. (1) This regression is run over the period 2003-2005, for which we are able to distinguish regular immigrants awarded 
citizenship, permanent visa, and temporary visa. 
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Table 3 
EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
 
 [1]  [2] 
    
















Years in Italy * Eastern Europe    0.035*** 
(0.003) 
Years in Italy * Asia    0.041*** 
(0.003) 
Years in Italy * Africa    0.041*** 
(0.003) 
Years in Italy * Latin America    0.032*** 
(0.003) 
Exper. abroad * Eastern Europe    0.008*** 
(0.001) 
Exper. abroad * Asia    0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Exper. abroad * Africa    0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Exper. abroad * Latin America    0.008*** 
(0.001) 
Sector dummies  Yes  Yes 
R
2 adj.  0.39  0.40 
No. Obs.  25,849  25,849 
The left-hand side variable is the log of net monthly wages. White-robust standard errors are in brackets. Stars 
show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, ** between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, * between 5 per cent and 
10 per cent. The regressions also include the variables (Years in Italy)^2, (Experience abroad)^2, Female, 
Married, Irregular. Every regression is weighted according to the sample design. 
 
 




 Stayers  Movers 
 [1]  [2] 








































Origin country*Mover  Yes 
Sector dummies  Yes 
R
2 adj.  0.40 
No. Obs.  25,849 
The left-hand side variable is the log of net monthly wages. White-robust standard errors are 
in brackets. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, ** between 1 per cent and 
5 per cent, * between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Every regression is weighted according to 
the sample design. 
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Table 5 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK: FIRST STAGE 
 
 
   
First-stage probit 



























Time dummies  Yes 
Spatial controls  Provinces 
Pseudo R
2   0.10 
No. Obs.  36,516 
The left-hand side variable is the worker status. Standard errors are in brackets. Stars show 
significance levels, *** up to 1per cent, ** between 1 per cent and 5per cent, * between 5 and 
10 per cent. Every regression is weighted according to the sample design. 
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Table 6 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK: SECOND STAGE 









































































Irregular     -0.219*** 
(0.011) 
Italian citizenship      0.051*** 
(0.017) 
Permanent visa      0.059*** 
(0.009) 












Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Spatial controls  Provinces  Provinces  Provinces 
Origin country  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Rho 0.539  0.401  0.271 
No. Obs.  25,849  25,849  16,025
1 
The left-hand side variable is the log of net monthly wages. White-robust standard errors are in brackets. Stars show significance levels, 
*** up to 1per cent, ** between 1 and 5 per cent, * between 5 and 10 per cent. Every regression is weighted according to the sample 
design. Rho is the correlation between first and second stage residuals. 
(1) This regression is run over the period 2003-2005, for which we are able to distinguish regular immigrants awarded citizenship, 
permanent visa, and temporary visa. 





 Legal  Irregular 
 [1]  [2] 


































Mover    
Intercept 7.158*** 
(0.022) 
Origin country*Irregular  Yes 
Sector dummies  Yes 
R
2 adj.  0.40 
No. Obs.  25,849 
The left-hand side variable is the log of net monthly wages. White-robust standard errors are in 
brackets. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, ** between 1 per cent and 5 per 
cent, * between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Every regression is weighted according to the 
sample design. 
 




 [1]  [2]  [3] 





















Years in Italy  0.034*** 
(0.004) 
  
School   0.008*** 
(0.001) 
 




















Arrival-cohort dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Spatial controls  Provinces  Provinces  Provinces 
Origin country  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2 adj.  0.40  0.40  0.40 
No. Obs.  25,849  25,849  25,849 
The left-hand side variable is the worker status. Standard errors are in brackets. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1per 
cent, ** between 1 and 5 per cent, * between 5 and 10 per cent. The regression also includes the variables (Years in Italy)^2, 
(Experience abroad)^2, Female, Married, Irregular. Every regression is weighted according to the sample design. The omitted 
cohort dummy is the most recent one. 
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Table 9 
NON-LINEAR EFFECTS: 
RETURN ON SCHOOLING AND ON EXPERIENCE BY LEVEL  
 
  [1]    [2] 
 
Compulsory school  0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Compulsory school * East. Europe  0.009** 
(0.03) 
Undergraduate school 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Undergraduate school * East. Europe  0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Graduate school  0.009*** 
(0.001) 
Graduate school * East. Europe  0.010*** 
(0.002) 
Years in Italy1  0.112*** 
(0.028) 
Compulsory school * Asia  0.005* 
(0.003) 
Years in Italy1^2   -0.012 
(0.007) 
Undergraduate school * Asia  0.004** 
(0.002) 
Years in Italy2  0.090*** 
(0.016) 
Graduate school * Asia  0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Years in Italy2^2  -0.007** 
(0.003) 
Compulsory school * Africa  0.004*** 
(0.002) 
Years in Italy3  0.074*** 
(0.008) 
Undergraduate school * Africa  0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Years in Italy3^2  -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Graduate school * Africa  0.009*** 
(0.001) 
Years in Italy4  0.045*** 
(0.004) 
Compulsory school * Latin America  -0.003 
(0.005) 
Years in Italy4^2  -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Undergraduate school * Latin America  0.001 
(0.003) 
    Graduate school * Latin America  0.005* 
(0.003) 
Sector dummies  Yes  Sector dummies  Yes 
Pseudo R
2   0.39  Pseudo R
2   0.40 
No. Obs.  25,849  No. Obs.  25,849 
The left-hand side variable is the worker status. Standard errors are in brackets. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, ** 
between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, * between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Regressions include the variables  (Experience abroad), 
(Experience abroad)^2, Female, Married, Irregular. We split the variable potential experience in Italy into four groups: less than 3 years 
(Years in Italy1), between 4 and 5 years (Years in Italy2), between 6 and 9 years (Years in Italy3), more than 9 years (Years in Italy4). 
Every regression is weighted according to the sample design. 
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